Economic Analysis for Environmental Pollution on the Basis of Asymmetric Information by 范苑
学校编码：10384                                       分类号  密级    










硕  士  学  位  论  文 
   
 
非对称信息下的环境污染经济分析 
Economic Analysis for Environmental Pollution 
on the Basis of Asymmetric Information 
 
 
范  苑 
 
指导教师姓名：钱争鸣 教授 
专  业 名 称：经济信息管理 




答辩委员会主席：         
评阅人：                 
 









































                     声明人（签名）： 



































  1、保密（  ），在   年解密后适用本授权书。 




作者签名：      日期：  年 月 日 













































































With China's sustained and rapid economic growth, environmental problems 
have become increasingly prominent and thus gain widespread attention.  Protecting 
and improving the environment and achieving sustainable economic development 
have become China's basic national policy.  Nevertheless, the current policy focus is 
on how we can increase the input of funds for environmental governance to achieve 
the goal of improving environmental quality, rather than concerning about the low 
efficiency in current environmental policy or the institutional problems in 
intergovernmental policy implementation.  However, these two aspects of the 
problems are restricting China's environmental improvement.  The goal of this paper 
is to explore the root cause of these issues and put forward the practical and effective 
solutions with the methodologies of Economics and Gamble Theory. The innovations 
are as follows: 
(1)The paper qualitatively and quantitatively compares environmental pollution 
control policy tools, including fees and subsidies and tradable pollution permits, from 
the perspectives of complete information and asymmetric information.  The paper 
also puts forward a subsidies improved model under asymmetric information and 
theoretically proves that the tradable emission permits have equal market efficiency 
for controlling the four categories of pollutants. 
(2)The paper considers the random factors into the pollution controlling model, 
and establishes the multi-vendor game model to figure out the root causes of the 
"free-rider" problem between manufacturers.  
(3) Using the static and dynamic game models, the paper analyses the gamble 
behaviors between central and local governments in option and implementation the 
environmental protection policies.  The paper establishes a dynamic game model 
containing the government "reputation" and addresses some practical policy 
conclusions. 
(4) In view of the current conditions, comparing the differences between 
developed countries and China in the political structures, economic systems, technical 
standards, this paper proposes a more appropriate system for China's environmental 
policy.  
Based on the study of successful experience from foreign environmental 
governance and considering the current conditions of the development stage in 
China's restructuring, this paper introduces the economic analysis and game theory 
methods into environmental decision-making mechanisms, and well combines 
environmental-control economic policies with executive orders policies.  The paper 
analyses the gamble relationships between governments and enterprises, enterprises 
and enterprises, as well as government-to-government relations in the form of 
asymmetric information. For solving China's environmental problems, the paper 
pursues a more efficient and flexible environmental policy system, which will 
undoubtedly have significant realistic meaning.  
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